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TOHAK100  
DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS

TO JON HOWE FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

DELIVER TO JON HOWE IN SEALED ENVELOPE.

NOVEMBER 11, 1973

TO: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

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FOLLOWING IS A MESSAGE TO YOU FROM MINISTER YAMANI:

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

"THE OIL PICTURE IS NOT AS DIM AS I HAD PREVIOUSLY  
INDICATED. I AM PERSONALLY HOPEFUL THAT SOMETHING CAN BE  
DONE-- BOTH HERE IN SAUDI ARABIA TO CHANGE THE ATTITUDES OF SENIOR  
OFFICIALS AND ALSO LATTER WITH THE ARAB OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES.  
I REALIZE THAT IT IS NOT EASY AT THE PRESENT TIME FOR YOU OR  
ANY OTHER OFFICIAL IN THE UNITED STATES TO GIVE A PUBLIC  
STATEMENT FAVORABLE TO THE ARABS. HOWEVER, SOMETHING IN THIS  
LINE WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO OUR EFFORTS. IN THIS RESPECT  
I AM REFERRING TO A STATEMENT REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED  
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND, SPECIFICALLY,  
WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES."

DOS review completed

MORI C05387692

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SEC FILES

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2. DR. YAMANI STATED THAT THE MESSAGE ABOVE CONTAINED THE COMPLETE ORAL MESSAGE WHICH HE WISHED PASSED TO DR. KISSINGER. IN A DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED HOWEVER, HE MADE A NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL COMMENTS. HE STATED THAT A MEETING TO WHICH HE WAS GOING SHORTLY WITH THE KING HAD BEEN CALLED TO ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN THE KING'S APPROVAL TO TAKE CERTAIN STEPS WHICH WOULD EASE SOMEWHAT THE SAUDI EMBARGO AND OIL REDUCTION. HE SAID THAT A COMPLETE REVERSAL OF STEPS ALREADY TAKEN WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION, BUT THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE SOME STEPS WHICH WOULD MODIFY THE POSITION. IF SUCCESSFUL IN HIS EFFORTS WITH THE KING, YAMANI THEN PLANS TO CALL A MEETING OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ARAB PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OAPEC) TO INVESTIGATE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO EASE THE SITUATION.

3. YAMANI SAID THAT THE MAJOR PROBLEM FACING HIM WAS THE FACT THAT THE KING WAS SO TERRIBLY ANGRY AT THE UNITED STATES THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO GET HIS APPROVAL TO PROCEED. AS HE HAS DONE WITH OTHERS EARLIER, YAMANI ALMOST PLAINTIVELY LAMENTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD FAILED TO GET THE SAUDI MESSAGE GIVEN REPEATEDLY OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS OR A YEAR REGARDING SAUDI ACTIONS IF THE U. S. DID NOT CHANGE ITS PRO-ISRAELI POLICIES. HE AGAIN SAID THAT A COMPLETE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO WAS IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS TIME AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO PAY THE PRICE OF HER SUPPORT TO HER ISRAELI FRIENDS.

4. YAMANI SAID THAT "IF GIVEN THE GREEN LIGHT BY THE KING" HE WOULD DEPART RIYADH AT 1700 HOURS LOCAL TIME THIS EVENING 11 NOVEMBER FOR BEIRUT. HE WOULD PLAN TO REMAIN IN BEIRUT UNTIL TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY WHEN HE WOULD PROCEED TO GENEVA, APPARENTLY FOR THE OAPEC MEETING IF ONE IS TO BE HELD.

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